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IilTRODUCTIOH
In the summer of 1950 5, there appeared in every
ship and station in the U* S* Navy a document much like
many others In its format and method of distribution and
which probably received no more than passing attention
at the time of its receipt* As a matter of fact* the
then Secretary of the Navy Gates , on his return from an
inspection of United States naval activities in the I2u-
rcpoan area, including ships of the Sixth Fleet, asked
some pointed questions of his topmost military assistants
in the Navy Departments llr» Gates had founds with only
few exceptions, that this document, General Order 21,
had in fact been read by only a few naval officers and,
"by and large, had been seen only by the yeoman who had
opened the mail and had ultimately placed it in the
ship's files J v/hat was there about this particular gen-
eral order which would so set it apart from other general
orders as to make it worthy of follow-up attention by
the Secretary of the Navy? Let's break it out and take
a second look!
The first thing one notices is its brevity —
only ten short paragraphs on 1-1/4 pages* Its title,
"Naval Leadership" — certainly nothing start in that.
Possibly just another of the countless hundreds of other

2i of paper* which, have been generated on the case
subject down through the years* Yet* this one may bo
different after all* for in the text appear words not
normally encountered in official naval directives.
[oral character*" "good management practices » " Moral
responsibility 8 " "moral behavior/' "moral atmosphere »"
and Management effectiveness, " to name just a few* To
the average career naval officer* steeped in the tradi-
tions of an organisation whose guiding principles his*-
torlcally are synonomous with these very traits* a
jarring note was struck on realizing that the topmost
official of the Navy had seen fit to spell them out in
this context — not in a tale out of the romantic past
in which the protagonist is shown to possess these vir-
tues In the fullest measure* but rather in a general
order in which they are listed as absolute necessities
in the creation of an environment for effective leader-
ship and* further, decrying their laok in the naval
loaders of today
*
It is the purpose, then, of this paper to explore
into some of the reasons why General Order 21 was neces-
sary and to determine in a general way what has been





It will bo noted that a major portion of this
paper deals with the general area of enlisted personnel
of the Navy. Although done deliberately because of the
obvious fact that enlisted personnel account for a major
portion of our naval population, it is not in any way in-
tended to minimize the role of the officer corps in the
creation of the environment necessary for effective
leadership. Indeed, Secretary Gates emphasizes this very
point in his personal letter transmitting General Order
21 to all commanding officers when he says "The most
successful programs are those stemming directly from the
interest and direction of line officers," (5»P*2)
tihat was General Order 21 intended to accomplish?
Again citing Mr* Gates * "Personnel shortages make more
important than ever the improved utilization of our man-
power" and "The AtfOL rate rose 3Q% in 195? ovex" 1956 and
courts martial continue at a rate of 1,000 a week. The
human and financial losses in termc of wasted manpower
cannot be afforded^ either by the Navy or by our country •"
(5, Pol)
Let us look at only a few of the problems (8* p. 2)
faced tj the today — problems which in the main as

4susceptible of correction by effective leadership at
every level of command
»
1. ftvery month, enough men to man three squad-
rons of destroyers are In confinement «*
2ft Every month enough men to man a submarine
squadron are being discharged from the Navy with
Bad Conducts Undesirable, and Dishonorable discharges.
3* During 1955* the cost of work not done be-
cause of AV/OLiem was J100 million. This one hun-
dred million dollars Is not the cost of maintaining
prisons, of courts martial, apprehending prisoners,
etc. It Is simply the cost of time lost from work.
Question: with the cost of training one pilot {p?Q-
flight j, basic, advanced i Pensacola) currently about
J90,0QQ, how many pilots could be trained with this
$100 million wasted annually through time lost from
work because of AWOLism?
4-« In one week In Japan* 4- men died of overdose
of pure heroin, sold them for 25fi per "shot", a
ship returning from the Tar East had to discharge 5
men from a crex? of less than 300 for narcotic
usage or traffic.
5« At least enough men to man more than five
?orrestal-class carriers are hospitalized annually

5for nouropsychiatric treatment*
60 v/hat is the Impact on our International
relations of the continuing reports of the "ambas-
sadors of \merioa" staggering down the streets of
the Riviora s or smashing barrooms in Naples, or
tossing around foul language in Yokosuka — all the
result of excessive drunkenness?
The above are a few of our problems — thero are
many others but this brief listing should suffice to es-
tablish generally the magnitude of the task confronting
us as leaders
»
It Is submitted that neither moral nor military
leadership can ultimately be supplied by written direc-
tives, enunciated principles j* or training systems •
Leadership of men is by men and it requires leaders* Ad-
miral Burke has said* "Regardless of the technical advances
already on the scientific horizon, regardless of the un-
limited possibilities that are appearing in the atomic
age, men with honorable purpose will remain the ono es-
sential ingredient to successful operations « " (6,p 107)
Is there yet another side to the coin? Is the
Navy inspired exclusively by the apparently selfish motive
of getting the most out of the men available o Tradition-
ally, the Wavy has recognized its responsibility to the

6whole mans with his individual dignity and full poten-
tial of personal worth and democratic citizenship* The
Commandants FIRST IJaval Districts in his Instruction
1743*1 & says it this way:
Large numbers of young men are currently entering
the Navy, who., except for the partial mobilization
duo to world conditions 9 would probably remain for
several years within the sphere of influence of
their homes 9 where they would receive valuable guid-
ance in moral and spiritual standards • In addition 9
the increasing tempo and commercialization of our
ajaerican pattern of life 8 as well as deliberate^
subversive influences « have lessened the value of
the home and the schools as mediums for inculcating
in youth moral restraint and behavior* In many
ares^ our youth is not being grounded in the moral
restraints , spiritual values 9 behavior codes 9 and
habits of industry that wore responsible for our
becoming a great nation and are indispensable to
our very survival* To all categories of young men
Joining the Navy, therefore* the Navy itself must
act In loco parentis, we must strive to develop
and maintain among these young bluejackets high moral
tone and standards of character and behavior * Wo
must instill in them habits of industry 5 thrifts
loyalty, and pride of citizenship, Whether they
make the Navy a career or not, it must be our goal
to make them better men and better citizons for
having served in the United States Navy*
v/e come s then ? to the realization that our obli-
gation as leaders is a dual one — not alone to the Navy
but to the civilian community as well* To whom do we
turn 9 on whom does the responsibility for the discharge
of this obligation lie? There can be but one basic
answer: the officer corps of the Navy„ Through his
prescribed military functions s many of which are intimately

7connected with the neo'lsj, aspirations, and satisfactions
of his men* the Uavy officer is likely to become a sig-
nificant and meaningful 9 and hence imitable person to
his followers , whethor he desires such result or not*
Ilonc© his personal behavior must roflect the moral prin-
ciples which a program of moral leadership is to uphold©
If tho officer has not sorted out his own moral valiieo to
conform with what is objectively good and worthwhile; if
he has not brought his behaviors into correlation with
values to which he subscribes intellectually; if he is
morally disorganized and immature himself 9 ho is obviously
not qualified for moral leadership of others c The dev-
elopment of mature character in himself and its facili-
tation in his followers is a logical and prescribed
leadership responsibility vrhleh the Navy officer under-
takes in accepting his commission. Regardless of his own
personal motivation toward a naval career* whether he
intends serving only the minimum time required by law or
the maximum time permitted by law* his responsibility in
this regard is inescapable from the moment he dons the
blue suit.
Having taken an extremely brief look at some of
the conditions General Order 21 is aimed at correcting,,
and at the responsibility of the naval officer in the

8execution of its torms? let us now examine briefly th©
naval population with which w© must work — who it is s
what it is made up of, where does it come from?

CIIUT2R IX
OUR PZRSOin-JSL — E wCKGROUiiD .UJD i>i2!U,ORi:.llIGS
Keeping in mind that the intended audienc© of
this paper is composed in tho main of professional mili-
tary officers, it might be well to try and sot this sub-
ject matter in a perspective familiar to us alio Tho
following articlo, the more impressive for its having
been written not by a follow officer but by some anony-
mous editorial writer, appeared in the wall Street
Journal for 14 May 1952 • uhile probably no better than
many other similar treatings of this subject, the fact
remains that it was originated outside the military* It
conveys accurately and adequately the Navy officer *s
concepts of leadership, and its intor-relatod components
of authority, responsibility, and accountability. The
editorial was occasioned by the convening of a board of
investigation following the tragic collision of USS
HOBSON and U3S WASP.
One night past some 30,000 tons of ships went
hurtling at each other through the darlmess. vftien
they had met a 2S 000 tons of ship and 176 men lay at
the bottom of the sea in a far off place*
How comes the cruel business of accountability
•
Those who were there, those who are loft from those
who were there, must answer how it happened and
whose was the error that made it happen.
It is a cruel business because it was no wish of
destruction that killed this ship and its 1?6 men;
j accountability lies with good men who erred in
judgment under stress so great that it is almost 3te
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own excuse* Cruel* because no matter how deep the
probe* It cannot change tho dead, because it can-
not probe deepox* than remorse.
\nd it sooms more cruel still* because all around
us in other placos we see tho ploa accoptod that
what is done is done beyond discussion, and that
for good men in their human errors there should be
afterwards no accountability * • • • •
«
[Everywhere else we are told how inhuman it is to
submit men to the ordeal of answering for themselves.
To haul them bofore committees and badger them with
questions as to jhx^ere they were and what they were
doing while the ship of state careened from ono
course to another
«
This probing into the sea seems more merciless
because almost everywhere else we have abandoned ac-
countability » What is done is done and why torture
men with asking them aftorwards* why?...*..
vje are told men should no longer be held account-
able for what they do as well as for what they
intend. To err is not only human, it absolves
responsibility-
Svorywhere, that is, except on the sea. On the
sea there is a tradition older even than the tradi-
tions of the country itself and wiser in its age
than this new custom. It is the tradition that with
I
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responsibility rtqes .authority and with them both
/goes accoiintablXityl rsmphasis supplied,)
This accountability is not for tho intentions but
for the deed, the captain of a ship, like tho cap-
tain of a state, is given honor and privileges and
trust beyond other men* But let him set the wrong
course, let him touch ground* let him bring disaster
to his ship or to his men^ and ho must answer for
what he has done* No matter what* he cannot escape*
It is cruel* this accountability of good and well-
intentioned meiic But tho choice is that or an end
to responsibility and finally, as the cruel sea has
taught, an end to the confidence and trust in the
men who lead, for men will not long trust loaders
who feel themselves beyond accountability for what
they dOc
And when men lose confidence and trust in those
who lead, order disintegrates into chaos and purpose-
ful ships into uncontrollable derelicts. (9*p*155)
It can readily be seen that the sonso of this
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editorial., although inspired "by the collision of two
Navy 3hip3 £ is aimed at th© civilian community of the
newspaper's readers c Tho self- same civilian community
from which is drawn tho men and women that make up tho
U. 3* Navy* Wo in tho llavy get tho products of this
civilian community when they are about 17$ or 18 , or a
little older* la other words 5 thoir formative years have
DQQn spent in an atmosphere which apparently subscrlbos
to the ill-founded theoi'ies which prompted the "./all
Street Journal's rather thinly veiled indictment. It
might be said that \*e in th© Navy reap tho fruit of the
seed sown in civilian life* Let us 9 thons take a look at
what was happening to our people in th© 17 or more years
before they came to us* what or where they wore, and
what sort of lives are normal in our civilian communities,
In attempting to assess relatlvo importance of
various factors making up a composite picture of tho life
of the average United States civilian^ certainly groat
importance would have to attach to the' homo, the churchy
and the schools as having boon major influences in the
development of the country. From material used in the
Leadership and Administration courses givon at the ftavy*s
General Line School it is learned that, in 187Q* 1 out of
33*7 marriages ended in divorce. The United States
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currently "enjoys" a divorce ratio of 1 out of every 2
to 3 marriages* One hastens to add that we are not here
concerned with the morality of divorce; rather* we are
more interested in the relative instability of the chil-
dren of those marriages as compared with those of the
I3?0*s« in it significant that, out of some 45 million
children in \meriea todayr about 12 million live either
with only one of their parents or in an institution and
that the divorce rate i3 producing "broken home situations
for children at the rate of 150^000 per year? It is of
major significance when it is learned that, at one Navy
Retraining Commands a 5~yoar survey of its confineos
indicated that 82^ of them came from broken homes —
where marriage had been disrupted by death, divorce, or
separation* (8,p*5 ©t seq)
what about church? Admittedly a strong influence
for good in our national life, it must be agreed that the
most powerful and most direct influence of any church in
upon those who attend o Pointing up the fact that there
are millions of American people who belong to no church
or who attend only rarely, and that 96% of the American
people believe in God s a recent poll revealed that only 1
person out of 100 could answer correctly 10 rudimentary
questions, questions such as "Who preached the Sermon on
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the Mount?" 3ven among college-trained people* only 6
out of th© 10 questions woro answered correctly "by a
majority. A recont FBI survey of 8,000 cases of arrest
for juvenilo delinquency indicated that only 40 of the
children arrested ever attended church regularly* and
that, out of the entire 8S 000, not a single one of thoir
parents ever attended church* {8»z>»6)
VJith rogard to our schools* where discipline
traditionally was of prime importance, another recent
3urvoy showed that 65$ of our parents felt that discipline
in modern American schools is not strict enough.
The foregoing should not bo construed as in any
way inferring that the American home, school 5 or church,
have ceased to ho effective as wholesome Influences ; to
the contrary, they remain dominantly effective. It 1b
simply Intended that one recognize that changes have
taken place
*
Let us look now at some other factors which
have a bearing on the shaping of our American youth prior
to their entering military service.,
A loolc at the Uniform Crime Report reveals that,
between 1950 and 1955* while the population of the entire
United States was increasing by 7%$ the increase in crime
for those years was 26*7$ — almost 4 times as great.
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During 1956, 1 major crlmo was committed dvopy 12 o 2 sec-
onds* 1-iajor crimes registered a 21c3% increase in 1956
and included 55 rapes and 37 murders every day c In that
year, the major crime rate passed the 2-1/2 million mark
and was the fifth consecutive year in which the rate was
over 2 million o Now* what degree of involvement in
these figuros is represented by juvonilca — those 18
years of age or younger? (8 5 p*6)
v/e find that, in 1955? 42 of every 100 major
crimes were committed by those 18 or younger 5 of perhaps
even greater significance to we in the Ilavy is tho fact
that 21 out of every 100 major crimes moto committed by
those 14 years of age or younger* In the 14 or younger
age group, those who are today coming of age for military
service, we find the following sobering facts for year
1955*.
Major crime that year increased by 12#»
Children were arrested for 21,141 major thefts
,
4 , 211 auto thefts, 12*384 burglaries * 542 were ar-
rested for drunkenness , 12 for drunken driving* 84
for embezzlements 95 for forgery, 163 for rape, 23
for professional prostitution, and 22 for murder.
(8,p.7)
We have all heo,rd much lately of the apparent in-
crease 'In popularity of the "the world owes me a living"
philosophy* One wonders if the social environment in
which today's fUaerican youth is growing up? the
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unprecedented prosperity, tho need for manpower, the ever-
incroasinc opportunities availablo for youth, whother or
not this philosophy is boinc fostered by exactly those
apparently favorable conditions. Of course , one is con-
strained to add that there is here no implication that the
Navy today is being inundated by a flood of rapists
,
murderers, and thieves — rather only is it desired to
arouse speculation as to the possible effect a social
climate or environment which creates this type of citizen
might have on those apparently untainted and being ac-
cepted into the military
•
Now, in order not to damn completely only the
teenagers of today, let us go back a few years and examine,
on the basis of actual performance what tho product of
an earlier day did when exposed to the pressures of tho
communist prisoner-of-war camps in the Korean action
.
By now, the shocking facts reported by the Army's Lieu-
tenant Colonel tf« S. Mayer, a psychiatrist who was closely
associated with programs for repatriation and rehabilita-
tion of our POtf's from inception are so well known as to
render needless any detailed treatment here* Suffice it,
then 8 to consider only briefly how these men, the product
of the 1930' s, most of whom did their growing up during
the years of *jorl& uar II and shortly thereafter, stood
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up under the treatment of their captors. Consider for a
moment that* for the first time in our country's history,
not a single American prisoner ©soaped from an enemy
prison camp during the ontiro Korean action {4,p*l6)
;
that our POV7 9 s sustained a higher death rato (about 3873)
in captivity than in any previous war including the Revo-
lution (about 33%) (4 9 p«17) * and this despite a 3ignifi-
cant body of evidence indicating its attributabillty not
to communist maltreatment but to ignorance or callousness
among the prisoners themselves (4 r p«17) J that 3 in a par-
ticular group of 4*000 American jWb 5 about 1 out of
every 3 was guilty of collaboration with the enemy in
some degree 9 be it writing anti-American propaganda or
informing on comrades, and even extonding in oomo cases
to outright murder of fellow prisoners- (4,p,l6) con-
sider further that s only four days after our forces first
engaged the enemy in Korea, an American Army officer who
had been la communist custody for some 48 hours , made a
900-word broadcast in the enemy* s behalf ovor the Geoul
radio. (4 9 p»l8) Doctor Mayer5 in analyzing the causes of
this breakdown of porsonal and military discipline,
writes of the basic defect as lying in three areas:
First 5 in the area of character development and
the deveaopment within young people of an internal-
ized system of discipline*..
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Second, in the area of general educations
particularly .education about the vmoriean demo-
cracy — which, I think, has suffered at the hands
of tho3© who cry havoc at any hint of what they
choose to label "nationalism c w
Thirds in the area of military preparedness,
which in the minds of a groat many people resolves
itself simply into a problem of mechanics, "ballistics,
push "buttons and guided missiles rather than empha-
sizing .the moral and Gharacterological elements in
war* (6,Pol5)
Shis, then p is a rough picture of the performance
of the end-product of inadequate citizen-training in one
situation*
So much© then, for the relatively recent paste
Let ua now turn our attention even further hack in our
history and consider briefly a Navy which could have
prompted the writing of a paper entitled "Bureaucracy In
the Navy* w (3,P»;&7) "The author, Arthur K© Davis, served
for three years in the Haval Reserve during world. 'Jar XI
as an Air Combat Intelligence Officers two a product of
the ^uonset Point Officers Indoctrination school, and
sorved in two Fleet Air wings* While readily admitting
that Davis 8 views could arise from a purely localised
view of conditions in a specific command, it should be
born© in mind that he was a trained and mature sociologist
before coming on active duty* It is entirely possible
that his views on the naval social organization are valid
when considered in the light of his presumed analytical
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skills An this area* Turther* Davis* observations are
confined exclusively to the officer corps of the Navy.
"Observations are limited to four aspects of naval social
organisation: (1) tho tendency to avoid responsibility %
(2) legalism % (3) the Navy as an insulated occupation 5
(4) ceremonialism*" (3»P*348) In treating of the first
of those* under the heading of "Avoiding responsibility:
the philosophy of do-the-least" the author submits and
develops five propositions:
1* Shunting responsibility upward stems partly
from the universal fact that a functionary's area of
responsibility invariably exceeds that of his control.
2. A second incentive for buck-passing Is the
latent conflict between authority and specialization.
3« Bureaucracies often develop an osprit do
corps which congeals individual Initiative.
4-. Structuralised discrepancies between indi-
vidual effort and reward in military systems restrain
initiative in both war and peace, though for different
reasons.
5* The unofficial conception of a Regular Navy
career often minimizes assumption of responsibility.
(3 S PP 352-354-)
With regard to "Legalism: the psychology of
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affirm-and-conform" Davis suns up "by saying
Combining legalism and avoidance of unnecessary
responsibility* we arrive at the goldon rule fox*
tho professional military career: "7ollow tho book
or pass the buck*" (3,PP 355-356)
Developing tho aspect of "Tho Navy as an insulated
occupation" Davis mentions the tendency for Navy families
to hold themselves aloof from the community in which they
happen to reside* their tendency for flocking together
because of common ties* the non-political tradition of
the American military* the formalised social and ritual
activities, and the tendency toward development of paro-
chialism induced by the strong esprit de corps. Davis
mentions in passing the possibility of distinctive pat-
terns of sexual behavior among naval personnel* their
wives and Juniors, but which possibility could not bo
developed for lack of systematic evidence on "this im-
portant point." ( 3,PP 356-353)
A.s for "Ceremonialism: the conspicuous con-
sumption of military systems" ritual is likoned to the
golden calf of a military system whose sacred cow is
regulation* Having apparently had a connection with the
processing of awards in his command, the author mentions
the "strike-flight" system of "automatic" award of the
Air Medal and the Distinguished Flying Cross* In addi-
tion* on the subject of awards* he has this to say:
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\ ehcetful of ribbons dooa not moan that the
wearer io a super-hero. (Koto J In a footnote
qualification^ Davis .indicates the possibility the
wearer may indeed be a super-hero but his opinion
is that this is very unlikely*) It is an infal-
lible sign of only one fact — that he is a high-
ranking Regular Navy officer Regular officers
received a greater proportion of awards than Reser-
vists did5 and officers in general wore favored
over enlisted men* (3»PP 35o-359)
Ine foregoing article appeared in the periodloal
"social Forces" for December^ 1948 9 and has beon reprinted
and included in an authoritative text in the field of
human relations* With all due doferonco to the author*
s
academic qualifications and assuming he was simply re-
porting facts as he knew them, this writer is forced to
the conclusion that a most curious organization must have
existed in the commands to which Davis *vas attached*
T
.7hile not in the least agreeing with the bulk of the ideas
and theories he advances, one is nonetheless unablo to
dismiss his writings as those of another of the disgruntled
self-styled military "experts" whose outpourings flooded
the American literary scene in the postwar years. Rather,
one cannot but speculate on the system — what is there
in our "way" which would cause a professional sociologist
to build a treatise on bureaucracy around facts ouch as
these? The picture painted by Davis certainly differs
sharply from that of our ¥all street Journal editorial
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writer and his assessment of accountability as an inte£~




EURiSlU.OF IUV.U- FSR30IIB3L 3NLUE2D i'ZRSOIilSL STUDIES
Thus far** we have been dealing mainly with -a few
of the more general areas which, in aggregate, culminated
in the issuance of General Order 21 and Its exhortation
to develop and improve our naval leadership « In the
previously cited personal letter to all commanding offi-
cers, Secretary Gates said
Personnel shortages make more important than
ever the improved utilisation of our manpower. In
this era of advanced technology we tend to lose
sight °f the man behind the missile • • • • •
and
Maty of our problems can bo resolved with leader-
ship, better personnel management, and a sincere
evaluation of basic moral standards* (5)
Compares for a moment, Secretary Gates* words with those;
Never* I think9 in the history of our Navy has
leadership been so necessary a quality for the
young officer as today* The general feeling of un-
rest throughout the world, the shaking of faith in
old beliefs and in the established order of things,
the spirit* not exactly of Bolshevism but of dis-
content with our own position and rewards, all are
reflected more or loss among us in the naval service.
Or
Too often nowadays one finds a young officer
sitting in the wardroom and growling about the
shortcomings of the enlisted personnel he has to
deal with.
The latter two quotations were taken from an essay on
leadership, written by a Commander R. C\ Parker, USN,
tMrty-nine ..years., .ago.* in 1920* The article was reproduced
by Commander in Chief * U. S. Atlantic Fleet on 19 August
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1933 and is commended In its entirety (2) to the attention
of those of today's naval officers who feel they are the
victims of a recent deterioration of our American society
or who think of the current efforts toward improvement of
naval leadership a3 "just another program,"
From all the foregoing,, it would appear that the
Navy does 3 indeed., have a problem. Let us now oxamine
what we laiow about our Kavy enlisted population of today*.
Recent studies made by the Bureau of Naval Personnel (8 9
addendum* pp 1-12) have developed the following interest-"
ing facts (Complete copies of these studies and support-
ing work sheets are available on request from the Bureau
(Pers-F32) for further exploration of findings and con-
clusions therein discussed.)
*
1. About 7Q/2 of all naval personnel have no
record of disciplinary action against them*
2 a an additional 13$ or so have only one pun-
ishment of record.
3* The current disciplinary problem group (3 or
more offenses of record) involves only about 8~l/2#
of the whole Navy (about 50,000 men)* This does not
include the considerable past records possessed tj
seme 12$ of the petty officers (about 60^000 men).
4* Possession of considerable lords (over 1

2fc
offense) by about 12$ of all potty officers (or
about 60 9 C00 men) indicates that first cruise dis-
ciplinary infractions are neither a bar to ultimate
career success nor necessarily a mark of unsuitabi-
lity for a naval career* However9 these 60^000
petty officers represent career spans of 3 to 22
years whereas the current problem group of about
50 s 000 have become problems largely within 1 to 3
years e There is 9 therefore 9 a prima facie case that
the Navy can dispense with most of tho latter group,
particularly in view of the certain other unsuitable
group characteristics following,
5* Over 75$ of all offenses recorded were com-
mitted by men of tenth grade or less education al-
though these are only about 45$ of the whole Navy*
6* Over 55% of all offenses were committed by
men of GCT 4p or below who are only about ?>€>$ of the
whole Navy.
7* Men of age 23 and under who are nearly 2/3 ,
of the Wavy include about 508000 in the problem group
which accounted for 44»5# of all offenses studied*
8« a, subgroup termed "non-select" of low GCT (45
and below) 9 limited education (11th grade or less)-*
and young as© (22 and below) p which accounts for
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20$ of current enlisted strength* or about 120 $ 000
men 5 contains about half* or around 25*000., of the
current repeated disciplinary offenders* This is
about I man in 5 who is an offender at least once*
l&is nucleus of the current disciplinary problem
represents only about 4 to 5% of naval enlisted
strength and* because of deficient education and
limited learning power* has few compensatory attri-
butes •
9o Conversely, of the more or less select young'
men (near high school graduates or better* GOT 46
and above* but ages 22 and below) who are probably
about 45/* of current strength or about 285 * 000 men*
only 1 in every 11 or 12 is ever a disciplinary
offender-
Gome of the more elgnifleant factors in these
studies* then* may be summarised as follows:
1* The number of years schooling completed prior
to first enlistment appears of great significance in
estimating an individual's capability for a success -
• afful naval career* High school graduates and 11th
graders ma&e good naval bodies* for these produce
nearly 60% of all petty officers* only 24^ of the




personnel* Men of 10th grade or less education
make poor or fair naval bodies s for these produce
only about bQ% of the petty officers , about 75$ of
the military offenders and account for only h-5% of
total enlisted strength*
a« Years schooling completed is very mean-
ingful* Individuals of grammar school or less
education (about 15-l/2# of the Navy) furnish
nearly 40# of all military offenders of record*
bo Limited education appears to rolato to
low CXJT to a &og?ea» Individuals of low GOT tond
to leave school earlier*
c* Vfell over one-half of the individuals of
limited education in the Navy Join at age 17 and
this same group furnishes S0% of all military
offenders *
d* Although in this study petty officer
status is arbitrarily used as a measure of career
success 9 this is not an entirely sound assump~
tlon* The P01 and 1*02 grades contain over 50%
individuals of limited education of whoa about
half have considerable military disciplinary rec-
ords 6 Various tabulations in these studies show
that most of the vqtj worst cumulative records
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are "by men in these pay grades* This may be
Indicative of less than entirely desirable char-
acter in upwards of one-fourth of the men in
these pay grades.
2 C Age on first enlistment appears a very signifi-
cant factor in estimating career success* Indivi-
duals enlisting at age 1? often do so in consequence
of school faiiure 9 not necessarily arising from
intellectual ino.dequacy These men furnish propor-
tionately fewer good petty officers and far too
many military offenders
»
3* GCT score is HOT e either by itself or in
conjunction with other factors 3 of any use as an
indication of capability for conforming to naval
discipline* About equal proportions of men of high
and low GCT appear as military offenders in all
disciplinary subgroups
•
&# GCT score IS, v?nore the individual has a
limited education^ 10 years or less schooling
of considerable use in predicting petty officer
successes despite limited education and low GOT
(4-5 and below)
«
b* Men of high QGT have a good chance of
career success* 2-Ieax*ly 30?£ of all petty officers
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are in this group versus 55;S of all enlisted
personnel. But If they leave school too soon8
many of them (one- third) become disciplinary
problems
*
e* Men of low G-CT have limited chances of a
petty officer career* The 13% of low GGT and
limited education who are petty officers includes
many world War II petty officers who could not
attain their grade under current standards, or
many individuals who have at least two disclplljl-
•yiary offenses of resoi'-d* or9 many individuals who
break down under stress late in their careers (13
to 18 years) due to intellectual and educational
inadequacy j becoming alcoholics* neuropsychlatrlc
or other medical problems ? chronic debtors or9 on
occasion* major offenders*
4* with regard to the so-called MDebtors* the
survey sho\?s that nearly 1Q% are deficient in educa-
tion (10th grade .or less) and of lower half in mental
grouping* About half are petty officers and over
half have six or more years service* 1Q% are mar~
rleds with children* Over one-third of all serious
indebtedness occurs in 'three rating groups , vis:
Deckj, Supplyg and Sti , — rates requiring minimal
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educational and intellectual qualification,
5. As regards homosexuals * the survey shows they
seldom have any significant disciplinary record, that
they occur disproportionately in certain rating
groups to which they are apparently attracted by
the nature of the work* interpersonal relationships
and opportunity for privacy and freedom from super-
vision* and that they share no particular ready
identification characteristics
.
NOTE: IT 13 EMPHASIZED THAT THE FOREGOIKG-™~~ FIGURES WERE COMPILED FROM A. SAMPLING
OF PERSONNEL QHLX AMD THAT THE PROPER
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS TO RENDER THEM
OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY HAS NOT BEEN
CONDUCTED.





This, then, is an extremely limited look at our
Navy of today — the men drawn from that civilian com-
munity which our editorial writer says "has abandoned
accountability*" It is their counterparts of whom Br*
flayer has written concerning their self-discipline and
rejection of authority in the communist prisoner of war
samps in Korea:
Soldiers in the most difficult, early days of
captivity, in a great many oases a evidently struck
out for themselves, so to' speak, simply because of
a failure to understand that only by a community
effort among them would the largest number survive*
Some prisoners talked about a "dog eat dog" atti-
tude, and "every man for himself" kind of behavior*
Prisoners talked about this quite a bit, to the
effect that, if a man started to get sick, the
chances were that his fellow soldiers would, for
all practical purposes, abandon him, partly in the
expectation that ho was bound to die anyway, and
partly because they were just too busy taking care
of themselves. * * * «
When I talk about disciplines I am not talking
about externally imposed rules* punishments, and
regulations. The feind of discipline that makes it
possible to maintain an organized group working for
the welfare of each member of this group is, and
has to- be s an internalized discipline on the part
of each individual, a self-disciplines which can't
be just an automatic, externally imposed set of
values. - • • they were confronted in the camps
with an interesting and rather new phenomenon*
This was- an attitude among great numbers of prison-
ers that when they became prisoners they somehow
ceased to be soldiers and, along with this, were
relieved of any responsibility to follow designated
leaders or to meet any of the ordinary requirements
of being a soldier • (They rejected authority) not
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only their offloors* but their non-commissioned of-
ficers* and also those among thorn who attempted to
exercise leadership and establish organisation.
(6, pp 13-14)
Contrast this performance* for a moment, with
that of th© Turkish POV/'s. Prom Xlnkead (4) we learn that*
although almost half of the Turkish prisoners were wounded
when captured, not a single on© died In captivity. The
secret of their "astonishing record" is said to be the
strict discipline they maintained while in custody* By
preserving their chain of command unbroken they were able
to present a united front to the pressures of communist
indoctrination* ©von though the men and their officers
were segregated like the rest of the prisoners* One
Turkish officers being interrogated by an American inves-
tigator, is quoted as saying:
I told the Chinese commander of the camp that
while wo were a unit* I was in charge of my group*
If he wanted anything done, he was to come to me,
and I would see that it was done* v/hen he removed
w&# the responsibility would fall not on hixaj* but
on the man next below me* and after that on the man
below him. And so on* down through the ranks, until
there were only two privates left* Then the senior
private would be in charge* They could kill us, I
told him, but they couldn't make us do what we didn't
want to do» Discipline was our salvation, and we
ail knew it. If a Turk had responded to an order
from his superiors to share his food or lift a lit-
ter the way I understand some of your men did, he
would literally have had his teeth knocked in* Not
by his superior, either, but hj the Turk nearest to
him* (4*p 166}

men* "£oxl haYO been chosen for- an opportunity not
accorded to all sen. Your word carries a lot of
Influence, If you imovi what is true and real, then
you can lead properly* (1)

OHAPTER V
tfEA.T HAS BSEDI ACCOMPLISHED
It has 'been the purpose of this necessarily
cursory treatment of the general subject of the social
climate of our country today and of our military today
to explain why it was necessary to "blow the whistle" on
us; why it had become imperative that we of the Navy get
off the diss and begin doing something besides giving
mere lip service to our traditions of Integrity* charac-
ters and devotion to duty and to country. In short® why
General Order 21 was Issued*
General Order 21 has now been in the hands of
the Fleet for some eighteen months* It has been impl ear-
wanted and supplemented hj a myriad of instructions and
directives at every level of command * Prior to attending
the present course of instruction, this writer served in
a ship-, a submarine tender, which was among the first of
the ships of the Pacific Fleet to institute a formalised
program in 3^tpport of General Order 21 * Our approach
contained nothing unique or startling; there was no at-
tendant hullaballoo on its inception* with a few iso-
lated exceptions, the only materials used were the
Leadership Discussion Guides furnished by the Bureau of
Naval Personnel* Ibe general policies of the ship were
changed only in minor cases (e«g«» the meaningless office
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of "police petty officer-" was abolished as one way of
demonstrating that the authority and prestige of a par-
ticular !!duty" patty officer lay not in the tin badge he
happened to be wearing every third day but rather in the
rating badge he wore on his arm* The latter* -unlike the
PPG badge* could not be removed at will and passed around
among members of the duty section as the fancy of the
moment dictated —- the authority and responsibility at-
tached to the individual qj virtue of his- inherent status
and rank: and not because he happened to be wearing a
badge*) a A determined effort was made to place decision
making authority at as low a level in the ship's organiza-
tion as was feasible* Petty officers were exposed to the
concept that* in addition to the authority represented by
their rating badges * they also had responsibility a,nd.
they would be held accountable for that responsibility
«
In addition* and to the maximum extent practicable in the
face of a chronic shortage, of personnel * certain privileges
and perquisites corresponding to their respective ofibices
were extended, .is might be expected s there was the nor-
mal amount of "It'll never work" response in the ship's
company when the program first made itself felt* The vexvy
nature of the ship's missions, requiring ac it does that
the excepts an the r
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vaa a further complication* It la axiomatic in the
Navy that the one and only place to knit together a
ship 8 s company into a cohesive,, disciplined,, and know-
ledgeable organization is out at sea ~~ not sitting in
the harbor of a large metropolitan area where duty in
a ship such as this becomes y&vj similar to a civilian
Job* It must be admitted that s as sea duty goes, duty
in a submarine tender makes protty good shore duty? In
any case* when this writer left the ship in July* 1959
•
the program having then been in effect for some 13
months P the lesson to bo learned was apparent to all.
The program really works if those applying it will only
work at making it work* Our reenlistment rate* both car-
eer and first cruise s was on the way up j our mast and
court martial rate was headed down and at a significantly
satisfying pace? our potty officers were taking evident
pride and satisfaction at their enhanced position in the
hierarchy,, and a "crow" was beginning to mean something




with this background of knowledge, it was
considered appropriate in connection with the pro-
duction of this paper to try and establish what has been
done in the .Pacific Fleet in general — not only what




A questionnaire, copy of which is attached as
Appendix A* was sent* to various ships of the Pacific
Fleet* The list included largo combatants (OV & 0X) 9
small combatants (DD, D2* & SS) # amphibious} types (4KA
& L3T) ? and other deep draft auxiliaries (AD, A0 t & AR) •
Names of ships were chosen at random from the respective
portions of the Standard Navy Distribution List* Forty-
eight ships wore interrogated? 36" replies were received
•
Jn the ease of those ships which did not reply 9 it Is
reasonable to assume that some people just don't answer
questionnaires* or that they do not have programs and
don J t wish to go on record to that effects °r that there
was a breakdown in the- communications* Inasmuch as the
questionnaire was intended to produce, not exact figures
but rather s impressions or opinions of those responsible
for prosecuting the various programs , the answers do not
lend themselves to a strict statistical analysis* For
this reason^ the questions and answers will be treated
only in general terms-
question. |l;
r
As would be expected* the majority
show their on-board strength to be below allowance
and generally a t, Fleet Manning Level* fne only
"soft" area noted as being consistently below the
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Manning Lovel is that of P02 and r03*
pfuest%vn_Jl2i_ CoincidontallyP replies were ro~
celvod from deploying ships with only one exceptions
The expected modal distribution of 9 months In home
port 8 6 months deployed s and 3 months overhaul time
was encountered* The time spent in home port in-
cluded a range of from 3 to 14 monthe; time deployed
showed a rang© of from 2 to 12 months; overhaul
time varied from to 5 months
«
'Question #3; Pour ships reported no programs,
either now or in the past. One declined to answer
and returned the questionnaire blank.
question
,-ffl: Admittedly a poor question in that
what is "formal" to one may vrell be "informal" to
another* It was worded this way in an effort to
find out how the various programs were regarded by
those administering them. By far* the programs re-
ported wore classified as "informal."
Question .£5; Three ships reported completion of
programs which lasted for two* five* and eleven
months respectively* The remainder reported their
programs as "continuing" with the length of time in
effect varying from a low of 4 months (3 ships) to
a high of 18 months (2 ships)* Qae reported having
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had a program for 36 months s apparently choosing to
count time invested in the original Moral Standards
and Character ?"&ueation Program which antedated
General Order 21* The modal figure for program dur-
ation was 5 months and 12 months
«
oues,tion f6; v/ith only three exceptions, the
"standard" method as outlined in the question was
reported in use* Que exception indicated heavy re-
liance on outside "Leadership Teams" with no mention
of special shipboard effort other than an inference
the ship is operated so as to live the precepts of
the general order* Another indicates the existence
of an snlisted Leadership council made up of "out-
standing 1*0*3 from each Department and headed by the
executive Officer and Ship's Operations Officer*"
Apparently meeting on an irregular basis ff the coun-
cil considers itoms developed either by itself or
the Commanding Officer and makes recommendations for
improvement; also P individual members perform pre-
liminary investigation of offenses committed within
respective departments and make recommendations as
to what disciplinary action should be taken. The
third ship;, with a "formal continuing" program is
simply operated so as to insure compliance with th
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precepts of the general order.
question -fji In only on© ease was the comment
on the Guides adverse ("Too technical* Need general
subheads and discussion topics rather than present
detailed write-up") * Two ships reported thoir not
using the Guides? one restricting their use to of-
ficer reading only and the other preferring "formal
lectures by trained teams*" The "other" materials
most frequently mentioned as used were tho tape re-
cordings of Or* Mayer *s talks and the training
film " The Challenge of General Order 21."
question fS
;
a. Ma3t Oases:- By a majority of almost 2 to
1* trend reported as down*
b« Courts Martial:- Trond solidly downj two
ships reported an increase* One of these com-
pleted a 5-month program last February and9 oddly
enough, the other was one of two having had a
program in effect for 18 months*.
c« Indebtedness:- No appreciable change, with
a solid majority reporting trend as level* Throe
ships, all with programs in effects reported an
increase
«
d« Reenlistment :- An even split betv/een reports
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of level and upward trends* Of four ships report-
ing downward trends 7 two completed 2-month and
5-month programs respectively; the other two
have had programs for 18 and 4 months, respect-
ively.
e. Petty officer prestige:- Admittedly a
difficult one to assess* Reports indicate an
upward trend by a slim margin with an unchanging
level reported as a close second*
f» Operational performance :- By a majority
of about 3 to 2 a reports of an upward trend lead
over those of a level trend* The ship with the
completed 2-month program reports a downward
trend
«
g* Miscellaneous:- There were two reports of
an upward trend in the area of administrative
discharges (possibly due to the 41-and-under GOT
discharge policy whiah became effective during
this period) , and morale ; a downward trend in the
area of unauthorized absence was reported by one
ship-
question ffl: a surprisingly large number of ships
reported no inspections during the past 18 months;
however^ those reporting inspections were unanimous
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iii their opinion that the program itself probably
did not appreciably affect the grades assigned? the
majority of the comments indicated the inspections
either to have been completed prior to institution
of their programs or that the programs had been in
effect too short a time to have affected the grade.
Question #10 ; Such comments as were made are





It is disappointing that the results of this in-
formal opinion survey are not indicative of a marked im-
provement in the Fleet* some consolation may "be taken
from the progross which has been made and tfcat, in view
of the large numbers of unchanging trends reported, we
at least haven't lost anything for our efforts It seems,
however , that a danger may exist in this type of ration-
alisation in that we may in fact only be perpetuating
mediocrity*
Again realizing that General Order 21 has been
in the hands of the Navy for some 18 months what do we
find? Over 11$ of the chips interrogated have no programs
in effect- Is it reasonable to conclude that this per*
aentage might accurately reflect the performance of the
entire Pacific Fleet or of the entire Kavy? Over 33% of
the ships interrogated have had their programs in effect
for 6 months or less* Does it tafee a full yoo,r foz* one-
third of the Fleet to comply with a general order? Of
the three ships reporting "completed" programs, two were
large combatants and the other a deep draft auxiliary —
types normally commanded by relatively senior captains*
From the writer's personal experience and from the intent
of the program as envisioned by the Bureau of Naval
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Personnel* It la known that it is impossible to do much
more than ret a program instituted, in two months, lot
alone complete ono*
It would bo convenient and conventional to dis-
miss the discouraging reports "by saying the survey took
place about a year too soon* However, to do this, one
would also have to dismiss the most disturbing aspect of
the survey — the comments made concerning the program*
The metihoAs of applications the attitudes* the sincerity
of the officers and* more important* the evident dis-
trust of the program^, all these play an important role
that. time alone may not solve. (On© hastens to add that*
there. being evidence of authorship on only a few of the
statements* the sentiments expressed therein may not
necessarily reflect those of the commanding officer of
the particular ship. However, there is sufficient evi-
dence of authenticity as to lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the comments were at least made hy officers *
irrespective of rank or billet* } It is reasonably con-
cluded* then* that in addition to a considerable lack of
acceptance of the program in the Fleet* there exists also
something less than complete understanding- If the offi-
cers themselves do not understand the importance of the
cgraa* and parenthetically it might be noted that the
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very ships reported saesinc reenlistment rates and short-
ages of personnel* how then is the program over going to
get off the ground?
Of considerable cheer aro the fine statements of
support made by many. Here again it is apparent that, by
and Xarse, the majority of our officers are sincerely
trying to do the right thing; it is only in the area of
the needed uniformity of approach that the reluctant




1* That a survey similar to this one "be made at
about this aam© point in tim© during I960*
2* Recognizing that, in the military <> ono never
Issues an order Baying "comply with my order" and that
some other way must do found to accomplish 'the purpose,
that immediate steps he taken to insure the presence in
every ship and station of the Navy an actively function-
ing program in support of General Order 21*
3. That the U* 5. Navy increase Its efforts in
the area of educating its personnel as to the nature of
communism* To this end, the following are recommended
for accomplishment as matters of urgency
;
a. ?or enlisted personnel*, th© development
of a training course in this vital area* satis-
factory completion of such a course should he made
a mandatory requirement for all personnel competing
for advancement to pay grade 2-4$ and a mors ad-
vanced form of course, containing matter suitable
for providing guidance in the conduct of guided
discussions of the subject matter? be developed and
mad© mandatory for those personnel competing for
advancement to pay grade 2-6*

4?
b* For officers 9 a correspondence course
in this area bo developed and made mandatory for
promotion above the rank of ensignc ;\ similar and
more advanced course should he required of officers
as a prerequisite to promotion to the grade of
lieutenant commander
Co That, in the expanded curriculum of the
Navy Management Schools a separate course in Inter-
national Affairs be established* iSiis course to
provide intensive instruction at the hands of
trained educators in the area of understanding the
threat of communism©
4* Again in the area of combatting communism
through education* the U. 3. Navy talce the load in the
education of the civilian populace • It is considered
that an organisation to accomplish this task lies ready
at hand in the membership of the Navy League, the Fleet
Reserve Association^ and members of the Naval Reserve
•
The Navy has the friendly ear of countless thousands of
citizens of the civilian community* many of whom'' are of
the stature needed to make an effort such as this succeed*
It is recognized that this subject would have to be
handled at the highest levels of Havy command and that
considerable preliminary groundwork would have to be laid
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in order to minimis© possible misconception or mlsunder*
standing through distortion of tho facts
»
5« Xn order to insure unifoxsaity of subjoot
matter, the Chief of Kaval Personnel develop the "train-
ing in organization and administration" desired by Sec-
retary Gates (5,p 2) for both officers and enlisted
personnel. It is considered that this 9 tooj, would properly
be the subject of training and correspondence courses of
appropriate levels for those who are unable to acquire
such training by formal means*
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CC&ME3JT3 IN ISPLY TO QUESTION 10
From a heavy combatant: It Is felt that General Order
21 has paid dividends to the -——- in terms of operational
profieiencyj, overall morale of the crew* and a definite
improvement in the area of petty officer prestige and ©rex?
discipline • The crew has sho%Tz an interest in the leader-
ship discussions and as evidenced !>y the record of the —
—
they have followed through • A. continuing leadership pro-
gram will he maintained on board*
G s 0»21 program is beginning to pay dividends and will con-
tinue to do so at an increasing rate* Oar program has
been in effect too short a time to show Darted results ixi
the operating efficiency of the ehlp» However* the inter-
est which the men are showing hy their participation in
the discussion sessions is I'qp^ encouraging* Those ses~
3ions are by no means a lecture* At first* they started
out rather slowly but many of them are now becoming lively
discussions* The petty officers are beginning to see
what the program is all about and what's behind it* For
the most part they are interested in making a positive
contribution* The men agree that the discussions bring
about a hotter understanding of why the Navy operates as
it does* Most of the officers are enthusiastic about the
program; some do not feel that it is of much value. We
shotild be able to give a more concrete answer a year from
now* Right now we are enthusiastic about the program and
optimistic about its potential*
,
^SBJL^SSSSJSsS^aiSBik' Leadership is an intangible
thing; Believe that General Order 21 is a good program
but It will noe-6, to be practiced continually and not via
the '*on© shot''1 method whereby a ship goes through the
steps and guide outline of the Bureau of Naval Personnel
and then drops the program as Complete* Feel that follow
up tj the Bureau is required and that type commanders
should also push the program and send out guides* 'She
workload on officers attached to ships is so great that
if Bureaus and large staffs could do the research and com-
pilation, the program would be more effectively carried
through in the fleet*
(NOTE: The above comment was received from the ship re-
porting completion of a 2-month program!)
/am a heavy combatant: Any urogram of this sort
pays dividends* 'Bis order has focused attention on the
id given impetus to what oth« e might have




From a heavy combatant: In each command there are
•varying conditions affecting the conduct and performance
of the crow* This ship has just returned from a vfestPac
cruise J during this period liberty was granted on the
"basis of " The deserving shall bo rewarded*"
-\s a result
the conduct ashore was outstanding and the subject of
many congratulating messages*
From a heaYvcoinbatant : The Now as a whole has
been on the upgrade regarding officer and potty officer
leadership qualities* This could be contributed to G-*G«
21 ^ However more career minded personnel enlisting for
the primary purpose of serving in the Navy rather than
trying to escape the draft has had a very noticeable ef-
fect « The large turnover of personnel keeps the program
from being as effective as it could be* Nonrated person-
nel* particularly low GGT and boots are the source of
most of the trouble* m case of boots in the states*
many commit violations before they can be squared away*
Low GOT and some others have acquired standards and at*
titudes over 18 years that cannot be changed in a short
time*
Prom a heavy combatant : It is difficult* even de-
c&ptive* to attempt to measure the success of such a
program as this hj mast cases* cndes on inspections*
etc* because of the multitude of interrelated factors
which affect these tangible figures* the results of the
program may be nearly intangible within a given command *
as was undoubtedly the case here « However* if carried
out in good faith* the program cannot help but pay divi-
dends* The G»G*2X prograra~was initiated* under the guid-
ance of the executive officer when the —-— commenced
her overhaul period in October 1956 * All officers were
divided into five or six discussion groups* each group
headed "bj a department he&&» Each group met once a week
when time permitted and various subjects were discussed*,
as 1 have indicated* including open discussion on prob-
lems peculiar to group members,, Furthermore 9 most divi-
sion officers organised similar groups among their petty
officers* using the KavPers Guides* various other mater-
ials furnished for use in divisional school* and their
own ideas* This program continued until refresher train-
.
•; when*, with an unprecedented turnover In personnel*
L available time was utilized in training for operational
readiness* It seemed to me that the program was charac*»
gr^at deal of lip i ice and little more*
It is not certain that leadership can be taught or learned
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because go much depends on whether 'the student wants to
embrace responsibility and exercise authority* This
want is not very prevalent among young men coming into
tho Hairy9 including officers. However* by exorcising: or
practicing certain principles of responsibility and auth-
©rlty 3 such as self-discipline, good organization^, good
trainings interest in the welfare of his mozi$ etc.* a
man may Decerns a good leader without the natural gifts
which is very rare anyway* In faot one may not know he
is a natural leader
*
From a small combatant: The two most important
<MHy»ni WMlfmii ii i inn li » rr'ii i n mm if iiwnn~Tiin'ifii*li-n'"«inn mTnrnrmrrr
points in making this program effective a a to show that
H ^3 S2& a ncnf concept and that it is divorced from the
religious connotation. As I see it* the value lies in
getting all hands |al^Jxy| ^^ th^sMSS about the subject
matter letting them "lead themselves to conclusions. Ac-
cordingly, the informal approach through the senior IJO s a
is the best* Sailers will more readily accept such a
program from fellow bluejackets. If presented by the
officers exclusively they are immediately on the defensive.
From a small combatant: Ehis ship is known as ardu-
*ri H*ii) iffr"trillman wiwt—ifl**Mn»rn.i i irimr~ —m i " i " nrnr tru nmn - **
ous sea duty* Out of evsry 15 month period it spends 6
months in vfesPac. .iftor 18 months overseas a man rotates
to duty in a Genus based ship - therefore the turnover is
terrific. (About 75% after every cruise*) llj personal
feeling is that if CO* a mast is made to mean something
our problems are nil. In other words if a TO o.ppears at
moat 9 he should lose his rate* If a man can't conduct
himself properly aehore - he shouldn't go ashore* Same
if he's a perpetual VD offender* The "liberty risk"
system works fine in wesPas - when a man knows he can lose
a month* s liberty by slapping a Japanese girl - he won't
do it* .1 stern hand giros you fine petty officers - if
you don't have them you*-?® had it* The greatest advan-
tage I ? ve seen from the dissuasion periods (we have them
after quarters) is that the officer or ?0 giving the lec-
ture actually gets closer to his men ~ hears their prob-
lems and gets to know how they think* They in turn get
to know him - if he's a good officer or £0 - they find
it out and vice versa* The "togetherness" idea is the
greatest ~ strong^ stern leadership also;
From a small combatant: Definitely feel program is
worthwhile and producing desired results. However it is
It CO', tuoh more effective if it war
receive far greater emphasis in officer training programs
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such as KHOTC and 003,
From a small combatant.: It is felt that the G«0*
21 program is very effective in continuing the moral
lining that many of the young men have had with their
families* However for those individuals which had little
if any moral training at horn© prior to coming in the Navy
the effect of the program is Blight*
E3S3B-JL.^^^2S^S^i^^. i & submarine is a small
closely knit group® Because of the teamwork required and
the usually high feeling of pride of accomplishment the
effect of a leadership program is not so readily seen*
However* I do fool our participation in the presentations
given by the MldPac Leadership Teas has moved everybody
aboard to reevaluate hie duty to himself, the Navy* and
his country.. Our informal application of those principles
is conducted periodically* even at quarters* I fool w®
cannot push this type of program too hard » or it will
lose its intrinsic worth* It must be continuing as there
is too great a personnel turnover to complete such a pro-
gram* On. a ship of this size arid poTn&pB even on larger
ships tho program should be completely informal* I
don't feel you can schedule a lecture on General Order
21 at 1400 every Tuesday* etc* Father you should approach
the subject not as a General Order* but as a responsibility
of each individual to understand why he is here and why
he is doing what he is doing* Once this is accomplished
you must instill in tho individual a genuine feeling of
pride to do his Job the very best that he can*
E^B^M^MB^^B07^ ^^^.'* I emphatically believe that
the gTo.21 program IsTa complete success* It has done
much to improve the overall combat effectiveness of the
.„....-. 2<he *.-..—- received tho overall Battle Efficiency
"E" for fiscal 1959* also tho Engineering tv3 r: with one
hashmark
.
From a O.Q&Q draft auxiliary : The —»— is a busy
ship* successfully achieving its mission » This success
is due in no small part to long hours and busy hours de-
voted by both the GO and X0* By the end of the day we
are tired of paper work* Jn view of the above I as not
willing to accept the additional chore presented by sub-
ject paper,,
&rvs Active lias be@n iv.-
prated to mean formal or as a result of an instruction.
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or- order promulgated locally* To this the sxime? is No»
However, leaders in the Navy are in training on a con-
tinuing basis. The cubjest of leadership training is fins
as a letter to GO's etc but appears out of place as a G*0,
From a deeo d^^tauxiliary: Aboard this vessel it
is believed that the General Order 21 -program is paying
sores dividends with respect to the stimulation of thinking
and awareness of responsibility as appropriate in -the pot-
ty officer grades* However» it is felt that much more im-
provement can be made* It is a real problem to stimulate
the officers ana men into putting forth a more conscien-
tious effort in getting this program "off the ground"
and "rolling* f This is often the case with the "short
term'* officers in the Junior ranks who are not primarily
career minded. During the past year approximately 60
petty officers of the grade 3-5, 3-6, and E-7 attended a
one weelc PO Leadership school (1/2 day per day) in the --
area* Glasses were conducted by the —— -— Career Ap-
praisal Team using the General Order 21 program material*
Comments from petty officers who attended have been most
satisfying and stimulating* Much improved evidence of
good leadership was observed in these same personnel in
subsequent weeks* It is felt much more of this type of
instruction or discussion is needed, with officers also
attending but in separate classes* It is felt in this
command that more intensified application of the General
Order 21 program is needed throughout all echelons of com-
mand* The answer as to how to get it fully started and
running smoothly and efficientlys however? is still being
evolved*
^^^Mj^Rj^ik^m^^n.'' Leadership cannot be
•legislated*" I think the program is paying dividends
MH§IIS£ I deem it a sorry state of affairs \th®n we must
teach, and preach those factors* The attributes of lead-
ership should become part of each leader thru his experi-
ences and the discipline of the Service* Did the Navy
of the twenties and thirties require a program? tthat
about the Royal Navy? what 1 am saying is this, some-
thing is wrong vh&n we must have a program (admittedly a
good one) to teach officers and J?0 factors that once were
assumed to be possessed by every military leader* The
issue is not being squarely faced* v/hen we do* the UCKJ»
s pampering in boot camps , the bowing to the !tKothor
and 'fives Giub" will come to an end* We will demand and
expect our leaders to produce or face dismissal or reduc-
tion. In the meantime* continue the program and derive
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what you can from it.
S^SB^^ML^M^S^SM^M2. 1 Since inaugurating
our leadership program , much Interest lias been shown by
various members of the crew. I don*t believe it's pos-
sible to maxe a leader9 as such, from attendance to lec-
tures, etc* However* the program has shown to various
oetty officers those aroas where they have become lax and
the need of the Navy for good leadership. Also the pro«
gram has highlighted instances on board this command
where leadership was entirely lacking or where the proper
approach may have been much mors successful* Jhis area
is probably where the most effective training can be
accomplished* Also the lectures and class participation
have increased the interest shown hj members in the ever;
day problems of the ship* This is particularly so in
discipline cases*
Proa a deep draft auxiliary.! It is my considered
opinion that General Order 21 merely restates ancient
tried and true axioms and principles of naval leadership
«
To most properly organized* trained?; and led commands
this General Order was unnecessary. High standards of
leadership, behavior* and the moral atmosphere of com-
mands have been the goal of the American Navy since John
Paul Jones wrote the qualifications of a Naval Officer in
a series of Letters and Reports. The ——- has the dis-
tinction of being the first Navy ship to win a Battle
rjfficiency Competition five years in a row, thus winning
the Gold "E. w This is indicative of a high quality of
leadership on the part of five different commanding of-
ficers and numerous executive and ship's officers over
the past five years (four of which were prior to General
Order 21} • General Order 21 may serve as a guide to em-
phasize the importance and the requirements for inspira-
tional, technical* and moral leadership to those young
officers who have integrated into the service from pro-
grams such as ROTC and 008 who do not have the background
and training in naval customs, traditions * and usage*
The desired standard of naval leadership oan never* be
accomplished by mere General Orders • it must stem from
the top down in actions and examples - and not Just Idj
words *
£S°B^^-^2£E^^CE»iMi^ij|^S ; — «*-•- program is in
support of ""the objectives of General Order 21 but uses
what different approach « le: .lly, 1 am not on*
those that believes that the younger generation is rtgoing
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to the dogs." Prom my observation* our men are "better
educated., more serious minded* and certainly a3 ambitious
to succeed and anxious to please as in the pre~?/orld War
II era of pacifist demonstrations at our leading univer-
sities,, swallowing goldfish at Harvard* and "over the hill
in October" in the Army* 2 don't think our job is so
much to remold the character of the men we get into the
Navy as it is to offer challenges to their abilities * A
man who has been given no dear cut responsibilities 9 who
has no sense of accomplishment or pride in his work is a
man who will soon bocoae disgruntled and who is ripe to
get into trouble. On the other hands men who are given
work which they can recognize as useful and constructive*
who are required to meet high professional standards and
who are encouraged to advance a3 rapidly as possible in
their profession are men who take pride in themselves and
their organization and stay out of trouble* With this
philosophy in mind our program* briefly, is as follows;
a) Set yotj high standards for cleanliness * maintenance,}
operational proficiency 8 and discipline, b) Organise
earsfully to insure that responsibilities for every man
ar© clear cut and understood » c) supervise to insure
that standards ar© mot* lost motion eliminated^ and goals
accomplished on time. This is excellent training of of-
ficers and fo's in leadership* d) Train through drills
to meet operational proficiency and school to prepare
personnel for professional advancement* Our normal rou-
tine is a drill each mornins and a compulsory school
period each afternoon for all hands* e) Inform all hands
of future operations 9 inspections* exercises s etc* f)
Justice s swift and sure for offenders - Recognition of
outstanding performance g) Counsel to men who give
evidence of difficulty in adjusting to Navy life*
Vfe also have a very fine athletic program^ a good
general m©ss$ library, etc. - the things which make, life
in the Navy a bit more comfortable and more enjoyable.
But the whole emphasis is on the fact that being a good
sailor is a difficult and challenging job - that running
our ship right is most important* Sorry to have taken so
much time to say only that we are trying to do only what
any well run ship should do* But I wouldn't want to
give the impression that such success as this ship has
enjoyed was due to a series of group discussions on such
abstract subjects as "moral values » " "leadership* " "com-
munism," "democracy," etc* I think this crew is one of
the finest I have ever served with* But they were good
men to start with* All that we have really done is direct




grog, an amphibious,,type t 1 do not believe General
Order 2i ha3 affooted this at all! while it points up
cur moral obligations and responsibilities I feel the
officers of the —»~— have the moral fiber that follows
General Order 21 without putting it in writing* We re-
ceive most of the bad apples of - - - - because of our
non rotation to v;e3tPao status and a3 a result our court
martial level is higher than it should be with most
oases occurring within the first months after a man re-
ports on board* Bureau of Personnel leadership teams
do fine until discussion atartSj, then they become too
dogmatic 3 argue against their teachings and want to de-
mand iron fisted discipline, order everyone to be morally
straight*
From an amphibious jfcgPQ. : G.O. 21 ha3 only made
mandatory what most Naval personnel have been doing for
years* It has brought needed attention to and emphasized
the need for increased leadership training* This ship
has always had an informal program and the overall high
morale ia ono of the prime benefits* Petty officer
authority and prestige has been emphasized with excellent
results
«
?rom an amphibious, type : G.O* 21 is definitely pay-
ing dividends but we must be analytical of our problems
to the extent that other cures in many cases are also
necessary* Leadership can't do it all* in fact, the de-
mands for effective leadership are more easily met when
the "climate" or conditions or environment of our overall
situation is improved* Me have shown regard for this but
can progress further*
From an amphibious „tyge ; I have had the ship for
two months* In that time I have participated in opera-
tions generated by the communist aggression in Laos* In
addition* the ship was forced to evade five typhoons in
five successive weeks* consequently *, I have just begun
to find time to look into administrative matters* Inso-
far as the ——•» is concerned* I find that they have a
fine leadership program* It is not yet formalised (this
matter is now being corrected) • You will note that none
of our ideas or practices are original* The significance
of our program may lie in the fact that concrete benefits




The following facts which bear directly on loader-
ship pertain to this 'ships 1) The ship won a red "E"
for engineering- 2) The ship won the assault Boat Insig-
nia signifying excellence in boat handling? 3) The ship
won the Squadron athletic Trophy* 4) the disciplinary
record was very good despite an over-extended tour in
WestFae* 5) In spite of being delayed in its return from
WestPae the morale of the ship's company remained high
suse all hands understood wh£ the ship had to remain
•
6} The ship has never (in the past two years) missed an
operational commitment* 7) The ship has tied its train-
ing program to its leadership program* Petty officers
will he sent to the newly established 2-week Leadership
course and have oQon sent to the 2-week Instructors
school at San Diego, All Division Officers have read and
studied the Division Officer *o Guide and the Watch Offi-
cer's Guide* BuPers material has "been used but not to
the degree considered necessary* Many of our 21 Junior
officers have taken the Wavy correspondence- course in
Leadership* Lectures are given hy the Division Officers
and all petty officers in a daily 0800 to 0830 division
instruction period* soma of the topics which hear on
G*0»21 are- a) How to carry on (sic) in Hong Kong* b)
Should you lend money aboard ship? c) Petty officer
traits* These talks have been given to every division
aboard ship* Lesson plans on these talks are prepared
'by the speaker and submitted for review hy head of de-
partment » This type of training has done much to give
petty officers self- confidence and ability to express
thesis elves clearly* It has also enhanced their standing
In the eyes of the non-rated men* Another way we have
tied our training to our leadership program is by having
cur junior officers and petty officers brief their people
before any drill ov exercise which has not been done for
a considerable period. Following the exercise a critique
is held wherein an experienced observer comments on the
leadership displayed* 8} The ship's leadership program
develops an appreciation of charity and justice* These
qualities have been collectively reflected by the crew's
voluntary gifts of three radios to Kong Kong refugee chil-
dren from Communist China* gifts of money to a Japanese
school on a small island near Kobe, Japan* and by gifi
of money and clothing to Japanese peasants stricken hy
the vicious typhoon Vera which killed 4500 people. These
a&m© qualities of charity and justice are emphasized in
handling personnel at all levels* whether at mast or
,: a bridge wateh« The ship's religious prog
the usual lay leaders 'ifho conduct services* While no
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great religious fervor has been observed* I can state
from personal observation that language and comportment
have- certainly changed for the bettor from shipboard
life of 10 years age 9} Saphaale has been laid on our
sports program which has h®sn intra-ship and inter-ship*
The ship won the squadron Trophy this year. In additio:
several scftball games were played with Japanese teams
during port visits* These games helped "break through the
language barrier and gave the crew first-hand experience
in tolerance and respect for other people's customs*
10) ;\q Commanding Officer I have spoken to the entire
crew on several occasions mostly with the thought in mind
of keeping our conduct record clean. Evidently they
achieved th®'!? alia* In addition,, 1 have followed the
custom of asking a man to my cabin Kh&nevQv his birthday
occurs o fhis amounts to an average of a man ®ver$ day*
While it generally follows that I must do most- of" the
talking* the man does have an opportunity to see his cap-
tain close up and also gives him a chance to mention any
special circumstances affecting his career* 11) The ship
has had one lecture (a year ago) by a leadership team
based at NA3 9 North Island* (Ho teams were available in
I'/estfac during our tour*} On our return to San Diego
this weeks we plan to enlist all-out aid from this lead-
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